

1989 March 31, April 1 & 2

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Democracy & Production Series

Should We Give Up on Socialism?

Michael Burawoy

Editor's Introduction

WITH THIS ISSUE *Socialist Review* inaugurates a series exploring some of the paths currently taken by debates in American Marxist theory. We hope that the series will lead readers who haven't paid much attention to recent developments in Marxist theory to get reacquainted, and to be reminded that there are vital issues being debated.

The series was inspired by a workshop on the "Politics of Production," which was organized by Adam Przeworski and held at the University of Chicago in November of 1987. There, several key figures in American academic Marxism—including Sam Bowles, Michael Burawoy, Przeworski, John Roemer, and Erik Olin Wright—debated the salience of production politics. The discussion convinced us that the concept of production politics is central to current work in Marxist theory in much the same way that the theory of the capitalist state was in the late 1970s and early '80s. Positions on the degree of autonomy of production politics, and the implications of that politics for global politics and the possibility of socialist transformation, provide key axes along which theories divide.

With this in mind, *SR* solicited short, critical articles from several of the workshop's participants. We think the responses provide clear introductions to each author's basic concepts as well as sharply divid-

ing their work from other participants.

Michael Burawoy opens the series with his critique of Sam Bowles and Herb Gintis' milestone work, *Democracy and Capitalism*. Burawoy's claim that production politics is both relatively autonomous and of vital importance provides a good starting point: recent Marxist theory, Burawoy charges, dissolves either the autonomy or importance of work-place contestations. Bowles and Gintis, he claims, sacrifice an analysis of the unique and historical character of what Burawoy calls "production regimes." The result is a reduction of workplace politics to a struggle for democratization, and a lack of appreciation for the socialist character of the struggles for democracy occurring in state socialist societies. Bowles' reply will run in our next issue.

Later installments of the *Democracy and Production* series will include an article by John Roemer on "Visions of Capitalism and Socialism" that questions the historical importance of production politics while capitalist property relations persist. Also scheduled is an exchange between Adam Przeworski and Burawoy on the micro-foundations of Przeworski's recent work.

Steve McMahon

Reflections on *Democracy and Capitalism*

Liberalism had historically the task of breaking the chains which the fettered economy and the corresponding organizations of law of the middle ages had imposed on the further development of society. That it at first strictly maintained the form of bourgeois liberalism did not stop it from actually expressing a very much wider-reaching general principle of society whose completion will be socialism.... [O]ne might call socialism "organising liberalism" for when one examines more closely the organisations that socialism wants and how it wants them, he will find that what distinguishes them above all from the feudalistic organisations, outwardly like them, is just their liberalism, their democratic constitution, their accessibility.

Eduard Bernstein,
Evolutionary Socialism

THUS SPOKE THE GREAT PROPHET of social democracy. The same words might have been taken from Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis' recent book, *Democracy and Capitalism*. Like Bernstein's, their "project" is to extend democratic rights from state to civil society. Like him they reduce the last two centuries of radical struggles to struggles for the extension of personal rights.* They substitute democracy for socialism more resolutely than even Bernstein himself: "Where workers' movements have mobilized more than handfuls of isolated militants...their inspiration and their solidarity has been based more on the demand for democracy than for socialism."¹ But this does not lead them to embrace liberal theory, because, like Bernstein, they regard the opposition to—not the unity of—property rights and personal rights as defining the history of capitalism.

They reject capitalism and state socialism as incompatible with the expansion of democracy: "The notion that either capitalism or state

*Bowles and Gintis don't define exactly what they mean by personal rights but they include civil rights, citizenship rights, democratic rights, and, more concretely, rights of assembly, rights to equality of opportunity, welfare rights, and suffrage rights. They use personal rights interchangeably with liberty, popular sovereignty and liberal rights. They are particularly interested in personal rights as a language, a form of discourse that becomes the basis for solidarity.

This paper was first delivered at a workshop, the "Politics of Production," held at the University of Chicago, November 13-14, 1987. In particular I'd like to thank Erik Wright and the *Socialist Review* collective, particularly Steve McMahon and Carol Hatch, for their comments and elucidations, and Sam Bowles for trying to set me right about his and Herb Gintis' work.

socialism holds the key to the future of social emancipation is the illusion of an era now happily behind us."² Instead, they call for a third way—the development of postliberal democracy:

The promise of postliberal democracy is to...continue the expansion of personal rights and thus to render the exercise of both property rights and state power democratically accountable. It affirms the traditional democratic forms of representative democracy and individual liberty and proposes novel forms of social power independent of the state; namely, democratically accountable, chartered freedoms in community and work. These aspects of economic democracy, including the democratic control of investment and production, are not only desirable in their own right, they are also an increasingly necessary condition for the viability of democratic control of governments.³

As a strategic intervention into the politics of the 1980s there can be no doubt about the importance of turning the dominant discourse to popular advantage. In this regard Bowles and Gintis provide us with a powerful critique of the contemporary United States and an agenda for its transformation. But they overestimate the potential of liberal discourse, both as a tool and a force in its own right. The extent to which liberal discourse is indeed universal and can be mobilized by any group signifies its weakness as much as its strength. And by focusing on the language rather than the substance of struggles, Bowles and Gintis tend to miss the specificity of the present period. Stemming the tide of pessimism, important and difficult as it is, shouldn't come at any price. It is not a warrant to make a virtue out of a necessity, to present a bleak political landscape as part of an expanding horizon of democratic control.

We must ask: how feasible, how viable is postliberal democracy? What is the basis for the expansion of personal rights and the democratic control over private institutions? If "the task today must be to redistribute power itself in order to provide a new democratic model of production and distribution,"⁴ as Bowles and Gintis claim, who will carry it out? Although they do not give it much explicit attention, it is clear Bowles and Gintis have in mind the extension of the civil rights movement:

The US civil rights movement is perhaps the most dramatic testimony to the contradictory nature of the rights conferred by the structure of liberal democratic capitalism. But it is far from unique. In Europe and North America, workers, feminists, the elderly, peace activists, and others have regularly resorted to the discourse of rights, regarding the liberal

democratic lexicon as their arsenal if not always their inspiration.⁵

These certainly go beyond the distributional and welfare issues that have preoccupied social democracy. But, as I shall argue, such new social movements, while making significant advances within the confines of liberal democracy, do not move us beyond capitalism.

Avoiding any analysis of these or other democratic movements, Bowles and Gintis, like Bernstein, do not explain how struggles for postliberal democracy will take root. The closest they come is to suggest that these will emerge from the discourse of liberalism or an unexplained "expansionary logic" of personal rights. Bowles and Gintis are, therefore, left making rhetorical appeals for democracy without grounding those appeals in real forces at work in society. The purpose of this essay is to give their enthusiasm for democracy some *grounding in reality*. I propose to do so by restoring production to the center of analysis, not so much for its economic effects as for its political effects, that is as a source and organizer of struggles. I argue further that the real radical potential of struggles for working-class democracy is to be found in state socialist, not capitalist, societies.

Democracy and Production

BOWLES AND GINTIS ARGUE that liberal theory presents private property as the basis of freedom—it denies the inherent conflict between the defense of private property and the extension of freedom by arbitrarily exempting arenas of private power, in particular the economy, from democratic control. Demonstrating that the economy is no less an arena of power than the state, Bowles and Gintis thereby establish the *ethical justification* for economic democracy. Moreover, they claim that such an economic democracy would release immense resources now devoted to pumping effort out of workers, which could then be used to expand leisure or increase material standards of living. So they also claim to establish an *economic justification* for economic democracy, although I will contest this view of the superior efficiency of economic democracy below. They fail, however, to locate the *political and social impetus* fostering democratization.

I wholeheartedly endorse their view that the sphere of production has a political and ideological dimension as well as an economic one. Indeed, my major criticism is that they don't take this idea far enough. They don't take seriously enough the ways in which production or-

ganizes and disorganizes struggles. Instead, they look at the politics of production from two other standpoints. On the one hand, their model of capitalist production introduces the idea of labor control as surveillance, but with a view to explaining *economic activity*: how capitalists get workers to work.⁶ On the other hand, in their understanding of movements for the extension of personal rights, they see surveillance as an *object* of political struggle, specifically the struggle for industrial democracy. They fail to discuss how production politics and the corresponding political and ideological apparatuses of production, what I call the regime of production, *shape* struggles. *Bowles and Gintis look upon production as an arena of domination to be democratized (a contested terrain) rather than a regime which generates specific forms of struggle (a terrain of contest).**

Once one constructs a theory of production regimes from the standpoint of the struggles they organize, then the inadequacy of their surveillance model becomes clear. It is but one form of production regime and an atypical one at that: the surveillance—or what I call despotic—model is largely limited to early capitalism, whereas what I call hegemonic regimes are more typically utilized under advanced capitalism.

However, further analysis of production regimes leads to the expectation that working-class struggles for the collective appropriation of society for democratic ends are most likely to occur not in capitalist society, but in state socialist societies. This is so for three reasons: (1) central ownership of the means of production eliminates capital mobility, which is so threatening to movements for worker democracy; (2) the character of the state socialist economy requires worker control for its efficient functioning, that is to say, central direction of production generates the material requirements for economic

*In their fascinating chapter five on “learning and choosing,” Bowles and Gintis underline the importance of production as simultaneously the production of things and of people. Their empirical analysis, however, doesn’t match their theoretical acuity. They insist that capitalist production generates a sense of political ineffectiveness through the fragmentation of tasks, the separation of conception and execution, hierarchical control of the labor process, and the assignment of persons to position on the basis of race, sex, age and academic credentials. They reduce all forms of capitalist labor control to surveillance and obscure the distinction between the labor process and political regime. Their abstract formulations miss the social and political texture of the workplace, the subtle combinations of force and consent that govern the process of production. The same is true of Richard Edwards, *Contested Terrain*. See Burawoy, “Terrains of Contest: Factory and State under Capitalism and Socialism,” *Socialist Review*, no. 58, pp. 83-124.

democracy; and (3) the production regimes engendered by a centrally directed economy lead direct producers to critique state socialism for failing to live up to its professed ideals.⁷

Bowles and Gintis’ foremost concentrate the rise of new social movements in advanced capitalism which congeal outside production. These social movements are rooted in an imminent critique of *capitalist* democracy for failing to live up to *its* ideals. What makes them “new” social movements is not their demand for the expansion of civil rights per se, but the simultaneous weakness of parallel working-class demands in capitalist society. The answer lies, I argue, in the character of contemporary regimes of production. Bowles and Gintis take as given that working-class movements have declined while new social movements have emerged in advanced capitalist countries. But I will go further to claim that, while they are by no means unimportant, social movements fighting for the *extension of capitalist democracy* do not lead beyond capitalism; they do not have the radical potential of working-class struggles *against state socialism for the realization of socialist democracy*.

Bowles’ Marxian Model of Capitalist Production

THE ARGUMENT FOR CHARACTERIZING PRODUCTION as an arena of domination is presented in chapter three of *Capitalism and Democracy*. Neoclassical economics uses two models of production, the first being a production function in which output is viewed as a function of a set of material inputs and services and an input of labor. Here, labor is defined as the effective work done. The second model is the cost function and here the *cost of labor* is treated as identical to the *input of labor* in the production function. But capitalists actually pay for so many hours of labor time, which is not the same as a particular amount of labor effort. By equating the amount of work actually done (in the production function) with the number of hours of labor hired (in the cost function) neoclassical economists overlook the problem which is at the center of the Marxian model: how to turn hours of labor sold (labor power) into actual labor.

Thus, in addition to production and cost functions, Bowles calls for a labor extraction function. The model is a simple one but has important implications. He argues that the amount of work done per hour of labor is a function of the amount of surveillance purchased and the ex-

pected income loss from being fired. Capitalists increase wages above the level that would clear the market so that workers will fear being fired. This extra cost to the employer beyond the market price is called the "employment rent." This is a condition for effective surveillance, which in turn is made necessary by the conflict of interests between workers and capitalists. In this way Bowles is able to demonstrate three propositions: (1) involuntary employment is a permanent feature of capitalism; (2) capitalists will select technology to enhance control over workers at the expense of efficiency; and (3) stratified pay scales within firms advance the interests of capitalists.

By posing the problem of extraction of labor from labor power, Bowles effectively demonstrates not only the superiority of the Marxian model over other models of production, but also that domination is at the heart of capitalist production. However, his particular model of labor extraction is but one of a number and by no means the most significant one at that. To develop Bowles' model, I want to insist on analytically separating the *labor process*—the cooperative activities in which men and women turn raw materials into useful goods and services—from the *regime of production*, which is responsible for regulating the economic activities as well as the emergent struggles. The labor process and regime of production vary independently—so that the same labor process can coexist with different regimes—as well as making their own individual contributions to the organization of struggles.

I contend that two DIMENSIONS of the labor process shape both its independent effects on struggle and its the operation and form of the production regime. First, the labor process has a *social* character, involving interdependent activities. Second, labor processes vary by the degree of *separation of conception from execution*, the level of skill retained by individuals and the level of self-organization in the workplace.

It is important to highlight the relative balance of *force and consent* within a particular regime of production. Models of surveillance tend to correspond to *despotic regimes* in which force prevails over (though never eliminates) consent, whereas in *hegemonic regimes* consent prevails over force (but never to its exclusion). Furthermore, if the coercive moment of production regimes rests on the threat of dismissal, then regimes will vary according to the *likelihood of dismissal* and the *reason for dismissal*. In hegemonic regimes dismissal is less like-

ly than in despotic regimes, and where it does take place it is often due to the contraction or closure of a plant rather than an individual transgressing some contractual agreement. These analytical tools allow us to derive the distinctive class struggles under state socialism as well as under early and advanced capitalism.

Early Capitalism

IN FEUDALISM IT IS POSSIBLE TO PIN DOWN the exact tasks each family has to perform on the lord's demesne. Because those tasks don't change over time, surveillance by the bailiff backed up by sanctions applied in the manorial courts are effective. But capitalism isn't feudalism. Capitalists are handicapped in their exercise of surveillance because of the dynamic character of the economy, which creates an irreducible uncertainty in the organization of work.

Changes in the instruments of production, as well as variation in materials and products, required workers to exercise a spontaneous initiative in the labor process. Detecting lapses in the expenditure of effort necessary for surveillance presumes managers or overseers themselves understand the labor process. It was precisely under early capitalism that workers often retained a monopoly of skills so that surveillance only undermined their willingness to render up effort, and thus surveillance was more often used to control the activities of workers outside the factory. Employers might rule over family and community life with their own police force, creating what were effectively company states which bound workers to the enterprise and controlled their movement between employers. This was particularly important where there were labor shortages.

But at the workplace, rather than directing artisans, early capitalists entered into various bargains with them. Inside contracting based on payment for work completed was particularly popular. In this way, capital gives up the direction of work to the craft worker who hires his own helpers, sometimes members of his family. Referring to the relations within the inside contracting unit, I call this regime of production *patriarchal despotism*; it is not the capitalist, but the inside contractor as patriarch who undertook surveillance over his helpers. It was this form of factory regime that shaped class struggles in the leading sectors of industry during the middle of the nineteenth century in England.

As Neil Smelser has shown in great detail,⁸ the factory movement—the timing of its struggles and the demands it made—were closely tied to the preservation of the family. When capital sought to encroach upon the systems of inside contracting, they were confronted by a nationwide political mobilization of operatives, not only for the limitation of the length of the working day, but also the preservation of patriarchal despotism as a form of factory regime. The working class under the hegemony of its dominant male fraction sought to enforce its interest in factory acts that would restrict the rights of capital to dispose of labor as it wished. Struggles spilled out from production into the community where they were consolidated as class struggles aimed at the state.*

Advanced Capitalism

ACCORDING TO BOWLES AND GINTIS, surveillance is effective because workers fear being fired. We might expect conditions under early capitalism to have been particularly propitious for surveillance, particularly if there was a reserve army of labor and limited forms of social insurance for the unemployed. Capitalists can exercise despotic control, threatening to fire workers at will for lapses in the expenditure of effort. Yet this first condition for the effectiveness of surveillance requires of addition of a second: managers must be privy to the details of production. They must be able to detect acts of sabotage, negligence, goldbricking, and so on. This only becomes feasible when scientific management and technological advances lead to the expropriation of skill from the shop floor. However, precisely when this begins to occur, the first condition—high risk and high cost of job loss—is no longer fulfilled.

The development of social insurance makes unemployment less costly and the development of restrictions on management's right to fire workers (for example, through grievance machinery and regularized industrial relations systems enforced by the state) limits the role of surveillance as a technique of labor extraction. As the classic studies of Gouldner, Blau, Roy, Crozier and others have shown,⁹ the introduction of due process and the specification of reasons for firing enables

*Whereas these industrial struggles were of a class character emanating from the economic arena, contemporary social movements are of a non-class or multi-class character, arising from outside the sphere of production. Fusing them together under the rubric of struggles for the expansion of personal rights denies them their distinctive character.

workers to resist surveillance by “working to rule,” to restrict output without infringing rules that would make them liable for dismissal. Given that any job requires some minimal spontaneous cooperation on the part of workers—the exercise of tacit skills that cannot be written down—the regularization of the process of firing makes surveillance counter-productive.

In these circumstances, management seeks an alternative way of turning labor power into labor. Instead of despotic regimes, we find hegemonic regimes in which workers are persuaded that it is in their interests to put in a minimal level of effort. Such a coordination of the interests of workers and managers works through the establishment of an arena of consent protected by an armor of coercion. First, there is an apparatus of coercion which reveals itself as the managerial power to fire. For this to be effective, as in Bowles' model, there must be an “employment rent”—that is, workers, or at least a sizeable proportion of them, must *fear* being fired. But the application of coercion must itself be the object of consent: it must be confined to agreed upon violations of specified rules and subject to a grievance procedure. This grievance procedure has the effect of constituting workers as industrial citizens, as individuals with rights and obligations.

Second, there are the apparatuses of the hegemonic regime which elicit positive consent, namely, those which tie the material interests of the individual to those of capital. Here we find the machinery of collective bargaining and contract renegotiation, a process of changing rules itself subject to rules. Its purpose is to distribute rewards and benefits in accordance with the profitability of the firm. A second hegemonic institution is the internal labor market which allocates workers to jobs according to some combination of seniority and experience, which increases rewards in relation to length of service. This makes it increasingly expensive to leave one firm for another, thereby forging a further interest among workers in the profitability of the firm.

Individual workers may have an interest in the viability of their firm, but how does this translate into the expenditure of effort? Each worker has an interest in others working hard, but not him or herself. Here we have to introduce the social character of the work organization—a factor obscured in Bowles' model. First, work processes are usually interdependent so that the effectiveness of all depends on the effectiveness of each. A solidarity emerges on the shop floor which provides

a basis for the norms of mutual policing. Workers “surveill” one another to guarantee adequate levels of effort expenditure.

Second, in order to offset boredom and arduousness, work is organized as a “game” in which all participate. That is, workers organize their daily tasks as a series of challenges to their ingenuity. Elevator operators see how many people they can stuff into their compartment, assembly line workers see how far ahead of the line they can get, and so on. This introduces a limited uncertainty into the labor process which induces workers to voluntarily participate in the pursuit of managerial goals. The more boring and arduous the work, the more games appear to stand out as imaginative products.

Although the rules of the game can be the object of struggle at any one moment, their definition is more or less agreed upon and enforced by workers themselves. The rules should be such that the outcomes are sufficiently uncertain to make the game interesting, but not so uncertain that they are independent of the skills workers can mobilize to influence the outcomes. From management’s standpoint, the aggregation of fluctuating outcomes should not seriously affect levels of profit. In constituting work as a game policed by workers, the labor process becomes an arena of consent protected from managerial interventions. Managerial attempts to interfere with worker autonomy or to introduce new rules may lead workers to withdraw from the game or construct an alternative game against managerial interests. In this hegemonic regime supervisors perform “guard labor,” not in Bowles and Gintis’ sense of policing workers, but in protecting the labor process from arbitrary managerial intervention and by coordinating work activities.

AS FAR AS COLLECTIVE ACTION is concerned, the effect of a hegemonic regime is to reduce the salience of class. Workers are constituted as industrial citizens by the apparatuses of production and when they engage in collective action it is over the distribution of rewards peculiar to the firm. In other words, class struggles are played out within constraints defined by the survival of the firm. They are bottled up within the factory and insulated from social movements forged outside work around non-class identities, such as race, gender, and religion.

Finally, one might expect that as the costs of being unemployed increase, along with the likelihood of being laid off through contraction of production or plant closure, surveillance becomes a more viable

weapon of labor extraction. But, at the same time, it also becomes increasingly unnecessary. In the present context we don’t get a return to the old market despotism, but we build a despotism on the basis of the old hegemonic regimes. There is no need for surveillance when workers recognize that, if they don’t work effectively as a group, the enterprise might close down. Workers effectively supervise one another under a new form of despotism in which management arbitrarily introduces new rules, intensifies work norms, reduces wages, and so on. Under conditions of unemployment, management becomes increasingly redundant so that enterprises facing economic crisis have taken a scalpel to the ranks of middle management.

Thus, the new regime is hegemonic insofar as workers regard their material interests as bound up with those of their employer. Interests are coordinated by expanding the terms of collective bargaining so that unions become accomplices in the promulgation of despotism. Under the previous hegemonic order the interests of capital and labor were concretely coordinated through concessions from capital; now they are coordinated through concessions from labor.

The Radical Potential of State Socialism

STATE SOCIALISM FACES THE SAME PROBLEM of translating labor power into labor. Labor shortages and state policy make it very difficult to fire workers and the costs of being unemployed are minimal. Under these conditions, one might expect, following Bowles’ model, that surveillance intensifies. Indeed, that is precisely what did happen under primitive socialist accumulation. Bureaucratic despotic regimes emerged to control the movement of labor with the help of the state. The Draconian labor legislation of the 1930s enabled the Soviet state to control the movement of labor. The state not only allocated labor between enterprises, but also penetrated the factory itself, where party and trade union became the coercive arm of management. Since the Second World War, such despotic regimes have tried to reconstitute themselves as hegemonic regimes. This is in part due to the character of the labor process, this time under socialism.

Under capitalism, competition between private enterprises pursuing profit leads to overproduction, to constraints from the side of demand. Under socialism, bargaining between state-owned enterprises seeking to increase their influence on the state leads to shortages—to constraints

from the side of supply. Supply side uncertainty is more disruptive of the day-to-day organization of work than demand side constraints and required flexible forms of work organization. Shortages of dramatic dimensions, such as in the 1930s, coupled with the Soviet Union's impossible plans, led to despotic methods of commandeering labor. As planning has become more flexible and shortages less dramatic, new modes of adaptation have emerged, in particular, self-organization on the shop floor. Because a centrally directed economy leads to shortages, it requires continual improvisation by immediate producers—that is, it requires self-management at the workplace. This is not the resurrection of the old craft worker—the unification of conception and execution at the level of the individual—but the unification of conception and execution at the level of the shop. Workers and shop-floor managers must work together in order to organize and reorganize production, both in response to changes in quality and to fluctuations in quantity of raw materials, machinery, and spare parts.

The technical necessity of such reunification does not imply its realization. The very necessity has threatened the interests of middle managers in maintaining control over production. As a consequence, they often intensify surveillance with counter-productive consequences. There is another problem: why should workers self-organize to advance the interests of the enterprise? The concrete coordination of interests of workers and managers in the pursuit of efficiency has always been a serious weakness of socialist enterprises. All sorts of experiments have been introduced in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe to elicit the spontaneous cooperation of workers and managers, but generally with mixed success.

Of particular interest is the introduction of inside contracting systems in Hungary.¹⁰ It is a system of circumventing wage fund restrictions on incomes so that work organized by self-selected worker collectives can be mobilized to tackle production bottlenecks. A more common strategy is to rely on piece-rate systems which reward according to individual work, but without a minimum wage. Instead of advanced capitalism's employment insecurity with wage security, state socialism offers employment security with wage insecurity.* The only

*Wage insecurity is an effective lever for extracting effort only if there is something to purchase with the additional income. The more available consumer goods on the open market, the more powerful are economic inducements to work hard. This varies between state socialist countries and over time.

way that operators can make their rates is to work together, collectively organizing the search for and distribution of materials, jobs, parts, and so on, on the shop floor.

Even if collective self-organization is an issue over which workers struggle in their day-to-day life this, does not by itself make for a class struggle, for an organization such as Solidarity in Poland. The hierarchically directed economy also creates regimes of production which foster a class consciousness that transcends the workplace. In state socialism, workers confront the state *at the point of production*, where it presents itself as the coercive arm of management and organizes compulsory rituals which celebrate the virtues of socialism. Workers are compelled to work communist shifts, to participate in production campaigns, production conferences, brigade competitions, voluntary work, and so on. The contrast between ideology and reality is played out on the shop floor to generate a spontaneous class consciousness hostile to state socialism for failing to realize its promises. Where workers are able to turn this consciousness into class mobilization, as in the Polish Solidarity movement, it is for greater self-organization independent of the state, rising toward collective self-management of society as a whole. To use the language of Bowles and Gintis: the discourse may have been antisocialist, but the project was socialist.

IT IS PRECISELY UNDER STATE SOCIALISM and not advanced capitalism that workers engage in struggles for the realization of a democratically controlled socialism. Under advanced capitalism the state presents itself not as the incarnation of capitalism, but of democracy, and social movements base themselves on the failure of democracy to realize its promises. A large part of the civil rights movement and feminist movement are struggles for the extension of basic democratic rights to all sections of the population. Struggles for rights over education, abortion, welfare, taxation and the environment are for expansion of the meaning of basic democratic rights. These are obviously important issues to struggle over. But they should not be confused with the struggle for socialism.

Neither Bernstein nor Bowles and Gintis give a plausible argument as to why the expansionary logic of democracy is irrevocably opposed to the expansionary logic of capitalism. Just because capitalists as individuals, as fractions of a class or even the entire class, might oppose the extension of certain democratic rights, it does not follow that the

same expansion is incompatible with the capitalist system. To be sure, capitalists have opposed the extension of suffrage, they have opposed the regulation of working conditions, the length of the working day, the combination of workers into unions, and so on. But historically these reforms have given added impetus to the expansionary logic of capitalism. The extension of civil rights to women and to minorities, the advance of consumer rights (such as safer cars or environmental protection) may threaten the short-term material interests of capitalists, but they are also precisely the pressures that compel capitalists to transform the means of production and renew the dynamism of capitalism. Moreover, the very possibility of extending personal rights makes it possible for capitalism to elicit consent from the poor and the oppressed—subordinate classes which are its own creation.

Capitalist society hides its class character and the expansion of democracy becomes the object of struggles. State socialism, on the other hand, attempts to legitimate its class character and thereby calls forth struggles against it and for a workers' socialism. Furthermore, once capitalism is taken as given, all groups in capitalist society become dependent upon capital and its expansion. Capitalist society is held ransom by capital's mobility from one city to another, from one region to another, from one nation state to another. State socialism has no such leverage over subordinate groups. It has no such mercurial quality. It has to stand its own ground through the legitimization of its defining principles and by repressing the class struggle it generates. Attempts to introduce market reforms and to experiment, however cautiously, with bourgeois democratic rights may satisfy material interests and demobilize workers and peasantry in the short run, but in the long run it leads to explosive rebellion as economic concessions diminish. Under state socialism, the demand for a workers' socialism cannot be contained within the boundaries of state socialism. It is a genuine class revolt which threatens to transform society.

Capitalist Democracy vs. Socialist Democracy

ALTHOUGH BOWLES AND GINTIS' WORK on education and national politics explicitly embraces the "positive" as well as the "negative" apparatuses of the state, the same cannot be said of their analysis of the political apparatuses of production. Their Gramscian view of state politics is compromised by a pre-Gramscian view of production

politics. Once we allow a Gramscian view of production, however, we see that the distinctiveness of production regimes in advanced capitalism lies in their hegemonic character.

The introduction of hegemonic regimes hold three sets of implications for the analysis of contemporary capitalism. First, the account for the weakness of working-class struggles in advanced capitalism. The weakness of such struggles explains the prominence of the non-class, "popular" demands of contemporary social movements. Second, surveillance is neither as costly nor as necessary as Bowles and Gintis maintain. The abolition of surveillance and the introduction of democracy would not release considerable resources for greater leisure and higher standard of living. Third, as Bowles and Gintis themselves suggest, the "democratic dynamic" and particularly industrial democracy has great difficulty in taking root as long as nation states are at the mercy of the international mobility of capital.

Turning to the regimes of production in state socialist society, central ownership of the means of production has three sets of consequences. First, it generates a working-class consciousness and, under certain conditions, struggles that are subversive of the existing order in the defense of democratic socialism. Second, it leads to a shortage economy which requires self-management on the shop floor for efficient production. It is under state socialism that we find both the material necessity and the class consciousness needed for struggles over the collective direction of society. Third, central ownership of the means of production restricts the mobility of capital so that meaningful forms of worker self-management can take root, raising the specter of nationwide class revolt.

This is not to denigrate the struggles for the extension of democratic rights under advanced capitalism, but rather to say that despite their importance, they are neither identical with nor lead beyond capitalism. Just as capitalism can absorb the demand for increases in the material standard of living of its subordinate classes, it can also accommodate the expansion of democratic rights. This is not a reason to abandon one's commitment to socialism in capitalist societies, but rather to reaffirm it as a goal, as a point of critique.

In short, capitalism deflects struggles away from itself and toward the expansion of democracy. By virtue of capital's mobility, capitalism contains those struggles within bounds of its own reproduction. State

socialism, on the other hand, generates struggles toward its own transformation. By virtue of central ownership of the means of production, the state must resort to repression to contain those struggles. If it takes place in any advanced industrial society, the struggle for socialist democracy (as opposed to capitalist democracy) will occur in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Bowles and Gintis give up on socialism because they are looking for it in the wrong place.

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